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ABSTRACT
In the framework of a longitudinal case study on a male tervueren dog, Philip, the present
paper was aimed to get a more sophisticated insight into the cognitive functioning of the
dog's mind. Our experiment was designed to study the dog's ability to recognize knowledge
or ignorance in others. The procedure used here was identical to that used in an ape-study
(Gómez & Teixidor, 1992) and therefore provides the possibility for direct dog-ape
comparison regarding their performance. Results show that similarly to the case with this
“enculturated” orangutan, after few trials Philip was able to adjust his communicative
behaviour to the state of knowledge of his human partner and cooperated successfully in
the problem solving task (getting the ball). The exact mechanism underlying this
communicative behaviour is still not clear, and both low- and high-level explanations are
considered. We suggest that this approach gives a new possibility to conduct comparative
studies aimed to understand the evolution of social cognition.
Keywords: Social cognition, Mind-reading, Dog.
RESUMEN
Lectura de la mente en perros. En el marco de un estudio longitudinal de caso único con
un perro macho de raza pastor belga tervueren llamado Philip, se realizó el presente
estudio a fin de obtener una comprensión más sofisticada del funcionamiento cognitivo
de la mente del perro. Nuestro experimento fue diseñado para estudiar la habilidad del
perro en reconocer la existencia de conocimiento o ignorancia en otros sujetos. El pro-
cedimiento usado aquí fue idéntico al utilizado por Gómez y Teixidor (1992) en un
estudio con simios, y, por lo tanto, posibilita la comparación directa perro-simio respecto
a su ejecución. Los resultados obtenidos por nosotros muestran una gran similitud con el
del orangután “culturizado”. Después de unos pocos ensayos, Philip fue capaz de ajustar
su conducta comunicativa al estado de conocimiento de su partenaire humano y cooperó
eficazmente en la tarea de resolución de problemas (obtener la pelota). El mecanismo
exacto que subyace en esta conducta comunicativa no está todavía claro y se discuten
diferentes explicaciones tanto de bajo como de alto nivel. Finalmente, se sugiere que esta
aproximación abre el camino para realizar investigaciones comparadas encaminadas a
entender la evolución de la cognición social.
Palabras clave: cognición social, teoría de la mente, perro.
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In a recent paper Hare et al. (2000) state that “It is a focal point of primate
cognition what individuals know about each other's psychological processes”. Recently
this issue attracted the interest of researchers, which was initiated by Premack and
Woodruff (1978) who introduced the concept of “mindreading” in the case of chimpanzees.
The hypothesis of theory of mind (e.g. Byrne & Whiten 1988) assumes that individuals
are able to represent others' mental state(s) and use this information to modify their
own behaviour. Interestingly, the hypothesis of theory of mind was very successful to
generate new research questions in developmental psychology (see Perner et al., 1989)
but has led to comparatively little progress in non-humans.
One main role of ethology in the study of animals is to emphasize the ultimate
causes of behaviour (Tinbergen 1951). The lack of functional analysis can lead to
misunderstandings and wrong hypotheses, especially in comparative behavioural studies.
In this vein, we need to investigate those circumstances in which “mind reading” could
be adaptive for a species. Unfortunately, Humphrey's (1976) argument (i.e. the appearance
of the more sophisticated form of social intelligence throughout the evolution can be
explained by the complexity of species' social life) is too general for specific hypotheses
to be formed. There is a need for more precise observations on the types of interactions
between the members of the group and on how much they serve the interest of the
individual and that of the group. In this regard Tomasello and Call (1996) do not see
any differences in the social life of Old-World monkeys versus anthropoid apes.
In terms of distribution of resources there may be two types of interactions
between the members of the group: the competitive and the cooperative. In case of the
competitive interactions individuals attempt to exclude others from attaining resources.
In cooperative relationships getting or distributing of resources is the result of joint
actions.
Two different experimental paradigms illustrate this distinction well. In order to
perform in the task designed by Povinelli and his colleagues (1990) chimpanzees had
to understand at least two aspects of social interactions. First, they had to understand
the cooperative intend of the observer to share the correct information with the subject,
second they had to be able to attribute mental states to humans.
In this task the chimpanzees could witness the action of food hiding (into one
of three boxes) but they were prevented from observing the actual location of the
hidden food. However, they could see that an “observer” was watching the hiding
person who was in the position to obtain information about the actual location of the
food. After the hider left both a naïve person (not present during the hiding) and the
observer pointed at one of the three boxes. The observer pointed always to the correct
box, the naïve person pointed always to an empty box. The chimpanzees had only one
choice. The results suggested (Povinelli et al 1990) that the chimpanzees did not recognized
that the visual information results in a change in the mental state (i.e. “seeing leads to
knowing”) and this knowledge could become “visible” in the behaviour.
Although Hare et al. (2000) task had a similar “logical structure” but it was
essentially competitive in nature. In this case both a dominant and a submissive chimpanzee
witness the hiding of one piece of food, whilst only the submissive one was exposed
to the location of the second piece of food. It was assumed that the submissive animal
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has some awareness of the knowledge of the dominant (having not seen the second
baiting) it should choose the food of which the dominant had no information. Chimpanzees
showed a strong preference (85% of total 54 trials) for choosing the food that was
hidden when only the submissive chimpanzees are allowed to watch. This suggests that
in certain situations chimpanzees are able to take into account what their rivals bear in
mind. (Although we should note that this task was less demanding for the chimpanzees
-i.e. they did not have to remember who saw what and then to choose between conflicting
but equally confident signals.)
The fact that chimpanzees were more successful in competitive situations than
in cooperative ones suggests that a particular mental ability (e.g. the recognition of the
lack of another individual's knowledge) might control behaviour only in certain situations.
It is also possible that representation in relation to the mental state of another individual
will only evolve in association with particular circumstances.
The context-dependency of mental representation abilities underlines the importance
of an evolutionary-ecological approach. Competition is a key element of the society of
adult chimpanzees while in humans adult and child relationships are fundamentally
cooperative. The above findings suggest that it might be problematic to model human
cooperative interactions (e.g. adult and child) in the chimpanzee. However, the relationship
between dogs and humans could offer an alternative opportunity (see Miklósi et al.,
2004; Hare & Tomasello, 2005 for reviews). According to our current knowledge this
relationship has more cooperative features than competitive ones (Topál et al., 1997;
1998; Naderi et al., 2001). Dogs cooperate in various ways with humans (e.g. guide-
dogs and assistant-dogs: Naderi et al., 2002; Topál, Byrne, & Csányi, note 1), and
possess many sophisticated socio-cognitive skills, for example, understand some visual
communicative behaviour in humans (see Miklósi & Soproni 2005 for review). During
domestication humans have most likely ousted individuals competing with them, which
could have resulted in enhanced cooperative abilities in dogs.
The recognition of another individual's mental state is a sophisticated form of
social competence as being manifestation of “distributed cognition” (Johnson 2001).
This ability is proved to be evident only in case of humans and can easily be measured
by verbal tests (e.g. Chandler et al., 1989). To study mental state attribution in nonhuman
animals three basically different non-verbal methods have been recently developed
(“Guesser-Knower” e.g. Call et al. 2000; “Competitive Conspecific” e.g. Hare et al.,
2001; “Ignorant Helper” Gómez, 1998, Whiten 2000). These studies were designed to
assess if subjects (mainly primate species) understand the casual connection between
past perception and present knowledge and/or whether subjects are able to take their
partners' previous experience or perceptual access into account (see also Virányi et al.,
2006). Some recent results seem to support the hypothesis that at least chimpanzees
understand some psychological states of others (Tomasello et al., 2003).
Here we investigate whether a dog is able to differentiate “knowledgeable” and
“ignorant” states of its human partner on the basis of whether human participated in
object hiding events or not. Our method is based on the study conducted by Gomez and
Teixidor (1992; discussed also in Gómez, 2004) using only one adult orangutan (Dona)
housed in a zoo cage. This nonverbal task was developed to assess Dona's ability to
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understand knowledge/ignorance of her human partner in a cooperative communicative
situation. For the training two big boxes locked with padlocks were placed in front of
Dona's cage. The Baiter came in, took the keys from a small box, opened one of the
big boxes and hid the food in it. Next he hanged the keys at their usual location and
left the room. Dona could get the food only with the help of a second person (“Giver”)
who entered the room and sat in front of the boxes attending to the orang-utan. If Dona
pointed with her extended arm to one of the boxes, the Giver would take the keys, open
the selected box and give the food to the orang-utan if that was the baited box. In these
“baseline” trials Dona acquired the “requesting” behaviour (pointing at the baited box
at the presence of the Giver) without difficulty. This was followed by two types of
experimental trials (test trials and control trials; 1-1 daily) were run interspersed with
the normal baseline trials. In the test trial, having locked the box the Baiter did not
replace the key but hid it somewhere in the room (without the Giver being present) and
left whilst in the control trials the Giver herself relocated the keys prior to the trial.
It was hypothesized that if Dona was capable of understanding knowledge and
ignorance in human (concerning the whereabouts of the key and the bait) then in the
test trials but not in the control trials she should also point to the keys before the Giver
started to search for it. In control and baseline trials however Dona was expected to
point to the baited box only.
Results showed that Dona failed to show pointing behaviour to the location of
the keys in control and baseline trials. Moreover in the first six repetitions of the test
trials (when the baiter relocated the keys) Dona did not point to the location of the keys
before the Giver tried to find them in the usual place, whilst except for the first trial,
she did point after the Giver failed to find the keys. After these six repeated trials,
however, she developed relevant signalling behaviour. Authors concluded that pointing
to the key was not a reaction to human's ignorance (“mental state”) but a result of a
fast and efficient insightful learning. It is important to note that when during other
occasions an unfamiliar person (a “threatening” stranger) replaced the key in the test
trials Dona showed significant improvement in her performance (i.e. she pointed to
both the key and the baited box when the Giver entered) (Gómez, 1996). It seems that
in line with other studies (see Hare et al., 2001) competitive aspect is a key factor of
the situation, which could have facilitated the emergence of mindreading behaviour in
Dona (see Gómez, 2004 for a more recent discussion).
Based this study by Gómez (1998) we wanted to investigate whether a dog is
able to adjust his “signalling” behaviour to the Giver's actual knowledge/ignorance
concerning the whereabouts of the key.
METHOD
Subject
The subject was a castrated male Belgian Tervueren, Philip, who was three years
old at the time of the experiment. Philip had been trained to assist his disabled owner
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by the trainers of a Hungarian charity (Dogs for Humans) for 6 months when he was
one and a half years old. Subsequently, two members of our research team observed the
dog over three years, in weekly two-hour visits, testing him on various sociocognitive
and communicative tasks (e.g. Soproni et al., 2002; Virányi et al 2004; Topál et al.,
note 1).
Procedure
We conducted the observations in the living room of the owner's flat (6m x 5m,
see Figure 1), which was familiar to Philip. Three boxes (that may be closed by a key)
were put on a counter at the height of the dog's eyes at 0.8 m apart from each other.
These boxes served to hide the dog's favourite toy (tennis ball). Two persons participated
in the experiment: the experimenter (Baiter, J.T.) who hid the reward and the owner
(Giver) who helped the dog to get the ball. All visits were recorded on video and the
training and test trials were analysed subsequently.
Preliminary training. In the first phase of the experiment the dog was trained to
solve a simple requesting task. At the beginning of each training trial the Baiter entered
the room and attracted verbally the dog's attention (“Philip, listen!”) with a tennis ball
in his hand. Then he went to the desk (the standard place of the key) and picked up
the key. After this the Baiter slowly approached one of the three boxes, opened it by
the key and put in the ball. Having locked the box he placed back the key on the desk
and left the room.
Next the owner (Giver) entered the room at a predetermined point looking at the
boxes he stopped and waited for Philip to approach one of the boxes and to prickle the
box with his muzzle. In this situation the owner was allowed to encourage Philip with
the “Show it!” command. If the dog did not choose a box then the command was
repeated at five seconds intervals, until Philip approached one of the boxes. When the
dog indicated one of the boxes unambiguously the owner went to the desk, picked up
the key and opened the box chosen by the dog. If the dog chose the baited box then
he received the ball for a short play. If the box was empty the owner was not allowed
to open another box. Finally, the Giver relocked the box, placed the key on the desk
and left the room.
Preliminary training trials were presented 18 times altogether over the course of
four weekly visits (4-5 trials per visit).  Baiting locations were randomly determined
with the restrictions that the ball was put in each box for the same number of times (6)
and never placed more than two times in succession into the same box.
Test trials. Following the preliminary training sessions three experimental conditions
were introduced in order to analyse Philip's “requesting/informing” behaviour. Experi-
mental situations were designed so that the Giver's knowledge concerning the whereabouts
of the tool (key) and the goal object (ball) were systematically manipulated in three
conditions:
Control. The procedure of this condition was identical to the task the dog had
to solve in preliminary training trials. These trials included to reveal whether Philip
acquired efficient signalling behaviour in the situation where he had to inform the
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Giver about the place of the reward only.
Hidden key. The procedure of this condition was identical to the Control condition
except, when the Baiter had locked the ball in one of the boxes, he did not put back
the key to the desk but instead he hid it somewhere in the room. The hidden location
of the key was different in each experimental trial. In these trials the Giver had no
information about the actual location of the ball and he had no information about the
location of the key either.
Relocated key. Prior to the trial both the Baiter and the Giver entered the room
and the Baiter picked up the key from the table. He showed it to Philip and then
relocated the key to another part of the room. During this the Giver followed the action
and movements of the Baiter very closely and care was taken that Philip was clearly
attending and following each step of the manipulation. The hiding place of the key was
varied from trial to trial (e.g. under the carpet, behind a book on the bookshelves etc.).
Then both persons left the room and after some seconds the Baiter re-entered. He
attracted verbally the dog's attention (“Philip, listen!”) with a tennis ball in his hand
and went to the key. Next he slowly approached one of the three boxes, opened it by
the key and put the ball in it. Having locked the box he replaced the key to its recent
location (to the place where he found it) and left the room. From this point the trial
continued in the same way as in Control condition.
Behavioural rules for the Giver during the test trials. In order to standardize the
Giver's behaviour across conditions, he had to act according to the following instructions:
After entering the Giver had to go to the “starting point” (see Figure 1) where he was
waiting for the dog's signalling behaviour.
Once the dog indicated one of the boxes (i.e. he touched one of the boxes or only
approached a box within 10 cm-s with his nose and waited there for at least 3 seconds)
the Giver had to act differently according to the particular type of trial:
Control. The Giver picked up the key from the desk and opened the box chosen
by the dog. If the ball was there he initialised a short fetching game with the dog.
Hidden key. The Giver approached the usual place of the key (desk) and started
to look for the key for 5 seconds. Then he turned towards the dog and he was waiting
for the dog's further actions. If the dog indicated at any time any particular place in the
room (approaching, sniffing, prickling with its muzzle, staring) the Giver went there to
take a close look. If he found the key he picked it up and opened the box shown by
the dog. If no box was indicated, the Giver went back to the starting point and kept on
waiting.
Relocated key. The Giver went to the actual place of the key (to where he put
it together with the Baiter) and opened the box selected by the dog. If the ball was there
he initialised a short fetching game with the dog. The Giver was allowed to open only
one box and if the box selected by the dog was empty or they did not manage to get
the ball within 1 minute, the trial was terminated and the Giver left the room.
The test trials were conducted over 11 weekly sessions, each condition was
presented once in each session in a randomised order (3x11= 33 trials in total). The box
in which the ball was put by the Baiter was also randomised across conditions. Video
recordings of 3 sessions were excluded from further analysis because the owner (Giver)
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violated the behaviour instructions described above.
Behavioural analysis. The behaviour of the dog was observed during the 1 minute
long trials and the analysis focused on the dog's “indicative” behaviours towards the
predetermined directions (i.e. baited box, location of the key). These behaviours were
as follows:
“Approach”: The dog orients towards one of the predetermined locations (key or
bait) and approaches it within 30 cm.
“Touching”: The dog prickles the baited box or the key with his muzzle.
On the basis of head orientation of the dog two behaviour variables were recorded:
“Gaze alternation”: Gazing (head orientation) at the Giver is directly followed
(within 2 seconds) by a direct head orientation at the location of the baited box
or the key or vice versa. We recorded how many times Philip oriented at the
relevant directions (Giver, location of the key, baited box), and how many
counter 
desk 
table and 
chairs 
boxes 
key 
Giver’s starting 
position 
Giver’s route 
Figure 1.  Experimental arrangement in the ower's flat (view from above, not to scale)
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times he displayed gaze alternation (i.e. back and forth alternation between the
three important directions). (For a more detailed description and justification
of this kind of behavioural analysis in dogs see Miklósi et al., 2000; Virányi,
Gácsi, Kubinyi, Topál, Belényi, Ujfalussy, & Miklósi (Note 2)
“Gazing sequence”: For the analysis of the sequence of head orientations toward
the three different directions (Giver, baited box, location of the key) we
established their relative rank order by noting the order of the directions to
which Philip oriented after the Giver arrived at the starting position.
Reliability of measuring the number of approaches and touches and the direction
of gazing were assessed by means of parallel coding of total sample by two observers.
The inter-observer agreements (Cohen's kappa) were 0.92 (approach), 1 (touching) and
0.87 in the case of dogs' orientation.
RESULTS
Training for the request task
In the course of the preliminary training trials Philip mastered the requesting
behaviour very quickly. He showed the Giver the baited box by approaching and touching
it within one minute and the human could select the baited box in all but two trials
(88% correct choices).
Test trials
In the test trials Philip showed good performance in all conditions. He got
quickly the ball in all (8-8) trials of the Control and the Relocated key conditions (on
average within 20 seconds) by utilizing the cooperative behaviour of the Giver. He
found the ball in most of the Hidden key condition trials (6 out of 8). It is important
to note that in this latter condition for the successful problem solving the dog had to
inform the Giver (and at the same time the Giver had to read the dog's behaviour) about
both the actually baited box and location of the key. The comparison of problem
solving latency (i.e. how quickly the dog got the ball) showed significant differences
among experimental conditions. Philip got the ball by the help of the Giver significantly
later in the “Hidden key” condition (Friedman ANOVA, χ2=11.2; df = 2; p=0.003;
Figure 2).
We found that Philip indicated the location of the ball by approaching and
touching the baited box in all trials of the Control and Relocated key conditions. In
contrast, the dog in these conditions did not approach and touch the key (Table 1). In
the Control condition he did so in just two cases: during the 1st and 2nd trial Philip
picked up the key from the desk (its usual place) and gave it to the Giver before
approaching and touching the baited box. In the Relocated key condition Philip approached
and picked up the key before approaching and prickling the baited box only one time
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out of the 8 trials (during the 2nd trial). Importantly, however, dog's signalling behaviour
has changed in the Hidden key condition. Philip informed the Giver about the location
of the key in most of the trials (6/8). In four cases (3rd, 5th, 7th and 8th trials) he
approached the key before going to the baited box, that is, while the Giver were still
waiting motionless and in the remaining two cases (1st and 6th trial) Philip first approached
and touched the baited box and showed the key only when the Giver failed to find it
in the usual location (Table 2).
Next we analysed how Philip divided his attention between the three particular
directions (the Giver, the baited box, the place of the key) in the different conditions.
Figure 2. Latency of getting the ball in the different conditions. (The time elapsed from starting
the trial until the Giver opened the baited box) (mean + SE).
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Note: Having been shown the baited box, the dog had no possibility to approach the key in
the Control and Relocated key conditions because the Helper picked it up. Therefore the baited
box then key option is irrelevant in these cases.
                              Approaching / touching
11240Hidden key condition
0710Relocated key condition
06---20Control condition
Neither key nor 
baited box
Baited 
box only
Baited box 
then key
Key then 
baited box
Key only
Table 1. Categorization of Philip's indicating behaviour in the three different conditions (8
trials in each).
170
© Intern. Jour. Psych. Psychol. Ther.
J. TOPÁL, Á. ERDHEGYI, R. MÁNYIK AND Á. MIKLÓSI
In the Control condition Philip predominantly looked at the baited box and the
Giver (in sum 84.4% of the total time) and spent in average less than 1 second orienting
towards the key or at other directions in the room. The pattern of the dog's head
orientation was similar in the Relocated key condition, in which Philip spent 85.3% of
the total time in orienting either towards the Giver or the baited box and he gazed only
rarely at other directions (on average less than 1 second). Interestingly however, in
those trials in which the Giver was ignorant regarding the whereabouts of the key
(Hidden key condition), the pattern of Philip's head orientation has changed strikingly.
He gazed less at the Giver and the baited box (64.5% of the total time) and at the same
time he focused his attention towards the location of the key. (26.2% of the total time
vs. 4% shown in Control condition and 7% in Relocated key condition; Friedman
ANOVA, χ2= 6.4; df= 2; p= 0.039).
Next we studied the changes in Philip's communicative behaviour as a function
of the Giver's knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the key by analysing frequency
of gaze-alternations. Results show that Philip turned his head towards the location of
the key approximately two times more frequently when the Giver was ignorant about
the place of the key (Hidden key condition) than in those trials when the key was at
its usual location or the Giver was involved in the relocation of the key (Friedman
ANOVA, χ2= 9.5; df= 2; p= 0.008). Similarly, compared to other conditions Philip
performed significantly more gaze alternations between the location of the key and the
Giver in the Hidden key condition (Friedman ANOVA, χ2= 7.05; df= 2; p= 0.029).
 
8 8 8 N 
20 
10 
0 
Control              Relocated key              Hidden key 
Figure 3. The total number of gaze alternations (per minute) occuring between any two of the
three distinctive directions (Giver, baited box, location of the key) in the three different conditions
(median, quartiles and extremes).
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Moreover alternating head-orientations between the baited box and the location of the
key were also observed in the Hidden key condition, but not in case of the other two
ones (Friedman ANOVA, χ2= 10; df =2; p= 0.006).
Figure 3 indicates differences in the total number of per-minute gaze alternations
across the three experimental conditions (Friedman ANOVA, χ2= 7.46; df= 2; p= 0.023;
in Hidden key condition Philip alternated his gaze more frequently among the three
distinctive directions).
The comparison of the Relocated key and Hidden key conditions show characteristic
differences in Philip's orienting behaviour (Figure 4). In the Relocated key condition
when the Giver was knowledgeable regarding the whereabouts of the key Philip
predominantly oriented first toward the baited box, and this was followed by gazing at
the Giver and last (if at all) he turned towards the actual location of the key (comparisons
of the ranks: χ2= 10.75, df= 2, p= 0.0024). At the beginning of the trial Philip first
indicated the baited box in all but one cases (in the third trial he showed first the
location of the key). In contrast, when the Giver had no information about the actual
location of both the key and the reward (Hidden key condition) we did not find such
Figure 4. Rank orders of head orientations (first, second or third direction of looking after the
beginning of the trial) in either of the three distinctive directions (Giver, Baited box, location of
the key).  Median, quartiles and extremes are indicated.
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bias in order of head orientations (χ2= 0.75, df= 2, p= NS). In this case the location of
the key and the baited box was equally preferred to be gazed at as Philip started with
looking towards the key in half of the trials (1st, 4th, 6th and 7th) whilst he indicated
first the baited box in the other four cases.
DISCUSSION
In the last few years a handful of investigations have argued that in the course
of adaptation to the human environment dogs have undergone significant behavioural
changes, and these species specific communication skills and social competences can
be regarded as functionally analogue behaviours to corresponding human skills (for
reviews see Miklósi et al., 2004; Hare and Tomasello, 2005). Dogs show sophisticated
skills in understanding state of “attention” when one is looking at a target (Call et al.,
2003; Gácsi et al., 2004; Virányi et al., 2004), and they seem to fulfil some of the basic
criteria to recognize intentionality in communication (Soproni et al., 2001; Miklósi &
Soproni, 2005). Similarly to human infants and apes, dogs are willing to look at the
eyes of their human partner in problem situations and they do this more readily than
wolves (Miklósi et al., 2003; Virányi et al., note 2). Eye contact is a way of establishing
attention that offers the possibility for mutual intentional communication.
The “Ignorant Helper” design (Gómez 1996; Whiten 2000) proved to be a useful
method for studying the question whether dogs are capable of relying not only on
directly observable behavioural cues of mental states as attention or intention, but are
sensitive to such “indirect' attributes of mental states toward human's presence or absence
in past relevant events (leading to knowledge or ignorance concerning the test situation).
Results show that similarly to that of reported in the case of the orang-utan,
Dona (Gómez & Teixidor, 1992), Philip had no problem with the request task and he
could show relevant “pointing” behaviour from the very beginning of the baseline
training. Moreover, in spite of the dogs' restricted gesturing abilities Philip modified his
behaviour adequately to the different experimental conditions. Philip effectively cooperated
with the Giver throughout the tasks because he showed relevant changes in his orienting
behaviour and in the frequency of gaze alternations between the target places as a
function of Giver's participation in relocating the key. Philip's seemed to have adapted
his behaviour to the changes in the Giver's state of knowledge, similarly as observed
in the great apes (Gómez 1996; Whiten 2000).
Taking a parsimoniously low-level approach it seems that discrimination learning
is a plausible explanation for the observed behaviour. Philip is an extensively socialized
and trained domestic dog who has sophisticated abilities for reading subtle cues of
human behaviour, and he has extensive experience with different communicative situations.
Supposedly, he routinely monitors the state of his owner's attention and is able to use
behavioural cues given by humans in order to effectively cooperate in interactive situations.
Therefore we assume that a rapid learning process can explain the changes in Philip's
behaviour, and as a result he became capable of adjusting his behaviour to the different
changed context of the problem situations.
Some observations, however, seem to contradict discrimination learning hypothesis.
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First, Philip met the test situations very rarely (one trial with each condition per week)
and the total number of trials (including preliminary training and all testing conditions)
was relatively low (51) compared to the several hundreds of trials in Gómez and
Teixidor's (1992) study with Dona. Second, over the three months period of the study
we could not observe any trends of the changes in Philip's behaviour (so if he had in
fact learnt behavioural strategies for solving problems it should have been based on
very rapid, “insightful” learning).
Among others Whiten (1997) argued that the manifestation of “mind reading'
skills could be species specific and are displayed as a special kind of “behavioural and
situational reading” ability (e.g. Whiten, 1997). Understanding such overt mental states
in others can be developed without any insightful recognition of other's subjective
mind-states. One possibility is to generalize own past experiences in order to predict
other's behaviour (and mental states) in certain situations. Another way of improving
social competence is the ability to recognize that a particular sequence of events and/
or actions precede certain behaviour response (and specific changes in mental states)
in others. In contrast, implicit theory of mind assumes that the animal is able to recognize
the relationship between the information observed by the other individual and the
action taken by the other individual subsequently.
The traditional comparative approach for studying the evolutionary emergence
of human social cognition is based on our homologue evolutionary relationship with
apes and monkeys. Recently, however, research has focused on other species that provide
analogue models of the evolution of human social cognitive abilities (e.g. Herman et
al., 1999). Dogs seem to offer an alternative approach to understand how social competence
has emerged and evolved. We assume that the new challenges of the human physical
and social environment selected for a canid species that seem posses a certain set of
skills which can be regarded as functional analogue behaviours to its human counterparts
(Miklósi et al., 2004). Importantly, the cognitive mechanisms underlying such perfor-
mance in dogs may rest on different processes in comparison to humans; nevertheless
we argue that such behavioural skills in humans were the necessary precursors for the
emergence of more complex “mind reading” abilities in our species.
In summary, Philip's performance shows that he was able to develop adequate
actions in the presence of a knowledgeable/ignorant human. Although in situ learning
might have contributed to his performance, the rapid adaptation to the social situation
from the beginning suggests that he had already possessed most of the necessary social
skills before coming to the experimental situation. This could be explained by his
extensive experience with such social situations during his life as an assistant dog but
the facilitating role of certain specific skills rooted in the adaptation process of dogs
in general could not be ruled out at this stage. Further experiments with large number
of dogs are required here to clarify the issue of contribution of dog-specific skills and
effects of learning but we know that wolves socialized to similar level to that of dogs,
generally trail behind the former in their performance in various simpler social situations
(Miklósi et al 2003).
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Notes
1. Topál J, Byrne, R, Miklósi, Á & Csányi, V (submitted manuscript)  Reproducing actions and action sequences: Do
as I do in a dog. Animal Cognition,
2. Virányi, Zs, Gácsi, M, Kubinyi, E, Topál, J, Belényi, B, Ujfalussy, D & Miklósi, Á (submitted manuscript). Comprehension
of the human pointing gesture in young socialized wolves and dogs. Animal Cognition
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